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1. Past and Recent Representations of The First Industrial Revolution 
 
In 1967 Marshal Hodgson (a godfather for global economic history) wrote 
these percipient words: “Without the cumulative history of the whole Afro-
Asian Oikumene of which the Occident had been an integral part the western 
transmutation would be almost unthinkable”.1 Alas, the recommendation by 
this eminent scholar of Islam to re-conceptualize the British Industrial 
Revolution within  the wider spaces, longer chronologies and cultural 
frameworks of the long and interconnected history of Afro-Eurasia was not 
taken forward until Eric Jones published the first edition of the European 
Miracle in 1981.2 Since then slowly but surely the bibliography of books, 
articles and debates relocating and reconfiguring the industrialization of Britain 
and the west as another long cycle in global economic history has proliferated 
and matured into a field that, along with accelerated trends towards a 
globalized economy, has revitalized interest in very  long run structural 
development across the humanities and social sciences. Thus, it is timely to 
follow Hodgson’s advice and endeavour to ascertain if Britain’s famous 
industrial revolution can continue to be represented as a conjuncture in that 
process. 
 As an internationally renowned episode in Hanoverian history it is 
certainly the first and the most famous example of sustained industrialization 
on record.  As an initial, precocious and celebrated case, generations of 
scholars have, however, exaggerated its Britishness (and its Englishness), 
reified its historiographical status and above all misrepresented what remains 
as a recognizable, explicable and not that remarkable discontinuity in the 
                                                          
1
 M. Hodgson, Rethinking World History. Essays on Europe, Islam and World History (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002) 68. 
2
 E. Jones, The European Miracle. Environments, Economics and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
3 
 
economic history of a well-endowed Island realm into a (if not the) paradigm 
case for liberal and neo-liberal models of economic development. 
 Industrialization is a highly significant historical process, drawn out or 
truncated over time which has occurred in local, regional, national, continental 
and global contexts. While its analysis now includes social, cultural, political 
and geopolitical  as well as economic forces, its outcome can be 
parsimoniously encapsulated and graphically illustrated in statistical form as an 
interlude of accelerated economic transformation from an agrarian or organic 
to an industrial economy.3 Following Kuznets, in quantitative terms what the 
most recent wave of interpretations have observed and measured in novel 
ways is “structural change”, proceeding more or less rapidly until majorities of 
national workforces cease to be closely linked to and dependent upon primary 
products and become employed either directly or indirectly (through related 
activities such as trade, transportation, finance, information, consultancy, 
protection, welfare and other services) with the production and servicing of 
manufactured goods. Statistically trends towards industrial market economies 
can be tracked with reference to data displaying shares of workforces, 
employed in industry and related services who were to an increasing degree 
located in towns, and with far greater difficulty, in imperfect and potentially 
implausible tabulations of national accounts, spanning long chronologies of 
time displaying the shares of gross domestic products labelled as industrial 
outputs. 
Although convincing arguments have been  made for the Netherlands to 
be recognized as “The First Modern Economy”, nobody disputes that Great 
Britain became the first national economy to complete a transition to an 
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industrial economy.4 For more than a century the realm’s famous 
transformation has been narrated and explained under such labels as The First 
Industrial Revolution, the First Industrial Nation, or simply as The Industrial 
Revolution. Anglo-American historians have analysed the decades and cycles of 
rapid change in British economic history for a  range of sub-periods running 
from the mid-17th through to the mid-19th centuries and represented them in 
arresting metaphorical terms as: a watershed, turning a point, a take-off and 
latterly, as a little - leading to the great divergence. Claims have been 
published that the British Industrial Revolution was more significant and  
pervasive for human history, than the Florentine Renaissance, or the French 
Revolution.5 The Industrial Revolution continues to be represented not only as 
a profound discontinuity for the history of a Hanoverian kingdom, but also as a 
conjuncture of trans-national significance for the future of the world economy, 
which positioned and periodized European, American, Asian and African 
histories into a “before” and “after” a demarcated stage in the history of the 
“First Industrial Nation”.6 
Yet nothing approximating to a “paradigm” for industrialization, which 
rescued first Britons and over time growing proportions of mankind from the 
millennial afflictions of poverty, malnutrition, disease and early death endemic 
to existence in traditional agrarian societies could conceivably be constructed 
from the economic history of a small island located off the coast of Europe. 
Nevertheless, there is no case for derogating a range of innovatory economic 
achievements that came on stream over the century which succeeded Britain’s 
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decisive victory in the Seven Years War 1756-63. Defined historically as the 
century which included discernible and irreversible accelerations in rates of 
increase of real income per head and in shares of the increment both to rates 
of growth in output per capita and labour productivity emanating from 
structural changes with urbanization promoting technical progress, it seems 
merely polemical to engage in semantic attempts to purge the label Industrial 
Revolution from academic discourse and public consciousness.7 Considered, as 
Hodgson advised, in a long stream of world history, on all the indicators, that 
economic historians have constructed and reconstructed since the publication 
of Ashton’s classic study in 1948, the transformation (although protracted by 
subsequent standards) became rapid enough to carry the national economy 
forward to the position of competitive superiority that the kingdom briefly 
enjoyed in relation to all other European, American and Asian economies 
during its long Victorian boom (1846-73).8 
Britain’s naval and commercial hegemony, along with the productivity of 
its agriculture had, however, been recognized by its Western rivals early in the 
18th century.9 Thereafter, Europeans accorded deference to clear comparative 
advantages exemplified by agriculture as well as several dynamic sectors of 
British manufacturing while retaining strong reservations about the social and 
political consequences of the nation’s pattern of urbanization and structural 
change. Thus a plethora of acceptable and calibrated historical data 
(complemented by a bibliography of impressions recorded by visitors from the 
mainland and the United States), justifies the  representation of the 
transformations that became clear after the Seven Years War as preparatory 
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stages for a precocious transition to an industrial economy.10 After all, that 
century of British history witnessed the development of novel techniques of 
production; the construction, if slow diffusion, of engines to harness a new and 
eventually dominant source of energy (steam), the extension of improved 
modes of internal transportation (canals, turnpikes and railways) the extension 
of more efficient forms of business and commercial organization, the spread of 
responsive systems of financial intermediation and distribution; the widening 
and closer integration of commodity and factor markets and the diversification 
of consumption. For generations of historians of Britain, all this occurred at a 
pace and upon a scale that in retrospect has been regarded as extraordinary, if 
not revolutionary for its time and location.11 
Nevertheless, as they become more cosmopolitan in their outlooks, 
historians of the First Industrial Revolution have become less inclined to ignore 
not merely its European, but its Chinese, Indian and African antecedents. 
Modern interpretations are now, moreover, less likely to exaggerate elements 
in English political institutions, social structure, and culture that not long ago 
formed the foundations of explanations for the nation’s precocious, relative 
and short-lived economic supremacy. Only “Whig” economists and a few 
economic historians continue to reify selected features and factors behind 
Britain’s particular transition towards the first industrial market economy into 
a paradigm that embodied optimal institutions and progressive cultural traits 
for enterprise and technological innovation that could be readily transferred to 
those rival but retarded economies on the mainland, provided that they too 
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became rational enough to adopt best practice (i.e. British) technologies, 
modes of economic organization and legal frameworks for production.12 
In short, a modern wave of historical scholarship has been concerned to 
educate students to become aware of the European, Asian, African, American 
and Imperial dimensions of the British Industrial Revolution; and to observe 
the rather rapid convergence of Western economies to comparable levels of 
per capita income and labour productivity in terms of the path dependent 
potential of each national economy. Diffusion models which, in effect, elevated 
the status of Britain’s transition from a precocious to a paradigm case are no 
longer regarded as an illuminating way to comprehend the industrialization of 
mainland Europe, the United States and East Asia let alone as a basis for policy 
recommendations to countries still struggling to industrialize. They have  been 
degraded into consoling but simplistic narratives purveyed by nationalistic 
communicators of British exceptionalism.13 
Narrated, interpreted and contextualized as a conjuncture within a long-
run chronology formed by the ebb and flow of global history, the universal 
status of the British Industrial Revolution has been reconfigured to embody a 
range of mechanical innovations of world significance (e.g. the steam engines 
of Newcomen and Watt, Corts’ path breaking technique for puddling iron, 
Arkwright’s water frame, the weaving machines of Kay and Cartwright), all of 
which can be represented as more or  less novel and indigenous to the Islands. 
Other achievements of the period, such as the invention of roller spinning by 
the son of a Huguenot refugee; Wedgwood’s “China” emulated in the 
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Potteries, painted by young women born in Staffordshire, but in colours and 
designs derived from Classical Greece; or the techniques used to manufacture, 
bleach, dye, and print cotton cloth made in Lancashire from organic raw 
materials cultivated on slave plantations and finished from knowledge and 
skills brought to high levels of perfection, in India, the Ottoman dominions, 
Sweden and France are no longer acclaimed as peculiarly “English”.14 Economic 
history has acquired a cosmopolitan perspective and it now seems futile to 
separate out “indigenous” from “foreign” components embodied in the myriad 
of manufactured goods produced and consumed in England during the reign of 
George III.15 
Fortunately, the last thirty years of research has allowed us to escape 
from the bunkers of national archives, to model, to amalgamate, to aggregate 
and compare a variety of transitions to modern economies, and above all, to 
assign conjectural, but plausible, weights and potential importance to major 
forces behind the accelerated growth of Britain’s per capita output and labour 
productivity from 1763 to 1846.16 Thus, causes or origins accorded significance 
that have now matured into reconfigurations of The First Industrial Revolution 
include: first and foremost, the kingdom’s productive and responsive 
agriculture, combined with its abundant and accessible endowments of coal 
and other minerals;  foreign trade (promoted and sustained by massive and 
cost effective state, investment in naval power); the rise of material 
consumption and, last in sequence, but not least in significance technological 
discovery and innovation. As usual, emphases accorded to inter-related and 
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inseparable forces behind any macro and complex conjuncture in history never 
settle into a consensus. These factors (if not their ordering or weights) are 
now, however, widely discussed as major causes in textbooks for the study of 
the kingdom’s economic history.17 Thus, the most recent interpretations 
utilizing macro data from demographic records and concepts and statistics 
derived from energy accounting have reconfigured the First Industrial 
Revolution as a prolonged two-stage historical process. Stage One exposes and 
forces and factors that carried a favourably endowed and located island 
economy to a plateau of possibilities for sustained modern economic growth 
based upon the cyclical growth of continuously higher levels of total factor 
productivity of the kind that became increasingly visible for segments of the 
English economy after 1763. 
 
Stage 1.1 Natural Endowments and National Institutions for their 
Exploitation 
For centuries before the Seven Years War, the British Isles had been blessed 
with a geography and an agricultural sector with clear potential to frame and 
support structural change. That potential included high ratios of livestock to 
grain output and very good (but not extraordinary) yields per arable hectare 
cultivated. Above all, and compared with most other regions of Europe and 
clearly with India and China, English agriculture was distinguished by high 
levels of output per worker.18  Given the Isle’s entirely fertile soils, favourable  
climate, and lush grass, how were these prior but basic natural advantages for 
a highly productive agriculture exploited? Supporters of an entirely traditional 
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Anglocentric view continue to insist that a rather distinctive set of property 
rights and tenurial arrangements for access to land had appeared earlier on 
the Isles than on the mainland of Eurasia. Over centuries of time the evolution 
of this peculiarly English system of control  over its natural resources was 
established, consolidated and maintained. Its essential advantages for long-
term development consisted of: the formation of larger scale units of 
production, efficient markets for access to farmland, concentration of rents 
from the well-defined ownership of both land and other natural resources and, 
above all, a steady reduction in the extent and control by peasant families over 
land and labour. In time a rising and comparatively high share of the kingdom’s 
cultivable acres became enclosed into larger scale farms. England’s kin-based 
agrarian workforce was gradually transformed into waged labour employed 
either by capitalist farmers or later on, when demands emerged for 
manufactured commodities, rural labour became the nucleus and then the 
core of a proto industrial and eventually an urban workforce.19  
Among agrarian historians following Arthur Young’s inclinations to 
represent the kingdom’s aristocracy and gentry as distinctively 
entrepreneurial, there has been a deferential celebration of unequal 
landownership as the benign outcome of market forces that promoted 
investment, cultures of improvement and the accumulation of capacities for 
efficient estate management embodied among those of noble birth who had 
acquired, by way of predation and inheritance (as well as purchase) an 
inordinate share of the nation’s land and natural resources.20 
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Markets are recommended by economists as rational institutions for the 
transfer of property rights to land, forests and minerals into the private 
ownership and/or control of those who can manage their use for purposes of 
production most effectively. The system of agrarian property rights (already in 
place well before the times of the First Industrial Revolution) embodied 
advantages for the realm’s precocious transition to an industrial economy, 
which included the outstanding capacities of British agriculture to release 
(“expel”) labour to other sectors of the economy. Nevertheless, there can be 
no presumption that the early emergence and the linear evolution thereafter 
of markets for the sale and purchase of land and of contractual rules, for 
access to farms proceeded mainly as an efficient outcome of English 
individualism, or from the mere extension of markets.21 Political and legal 
histories of the frameworks surrounding property and tenurial rights to the 
Island’s endowments of cultivable land and other natural resources reveal that 
they also emanated from far less “benign” historical forces which included 
conquest, internal colonization, the violent expropriation of ecclesiastical and 
common land, the systematic accumulation of power by closed aristocratic 
elites who, over time, severely attenuated rights of access to the Island’s 
cultivable land, forests and minerals by smaller freeholders and peasant 
families.22 Their persistent predation, coupled with an intensifying “pull” from 
high wages potentially available to migrants from the countryside to London 
and other maritime cities, engaged with realizing gains from overseas trade 
and specialization, also provided England with flexible markets for waged 
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labour for centuries before mechanized urban industries demanded  increasing 
shares of the nation’s workforce.23 
From the times of the Norman Conquest onwards England’s aristocratic 
elites had pushed  agriculture in directions conducive to the attainment of 
higher levels of labour productivity and away from the disadvantages for rapid 
industrialization and urbanization associated with peasant proprietorial 
relationships and household units for production that survived on the 
mainland and remained omnipresent across south and east Asian societies. 
More geographically reductionist accounts of the island’s advantages for 
that  early transition were also emphasized by physiocratic improvers who 
visited England in the eighteen century. 24 Their perceptions  that the Island’s 
favourable environmental endowments  (particularly lush grass) had 
encouraged the steady accumulation of sheep, cattle, pigs and, above all, 
horses, is now commonplace in agrarian history.25 By the accession of the 
Stuart dynasty, if not before, the kingdom’s exceptionally large population of 
animals provided the high value raw materials (wool, leather and bones), food 
in the form of meat and dairy produce,  extra supplies of energy and flows of 
organic fertiliser that had carried the productivity of English agriculture 
towards the head of European league tables. From that plateau after more 
than two centuries, animal and arable farming combined with an intensified 
exploitation continued to lend sufficient support to accelerated population 
growth, proto-industrialization and rapid urbanization, while avoiding 
                                                          
23
 R. Allen, “The Great Divergence in European Wages from the Middle Ages to the First World War,” 
Explorations in Econ.Hist. 38 (2001) 411-47. 
24
 K. Pomeranz, “Beyond the East-West Binary. Resituating Development Paths in the Eighteenth Century 
World,” Journal of Asian.Studies,. 61 (2002) 539-90 and Langford, The English as Reformers” 
25
 A. Wrigley, The Path to Sustained Growth. England’s Transition from an Organic Economy to an Industrial 
Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016) and P. O’Brien and D. Heath, “English and French 
Landowners 1688-1789,” in F.M.L. Thompson, ed., Landowners, Capitalists and Entrepreneurs (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994) 23-62, and Broadberry ed., British Economic Growth and M. Overton, Agricultural 
Revolution in England: The Transformation of the Agrarian Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996). 
13 
 
Malthusian crises, economic stasis and dependence upon imports of food and 
raw materials from outside the British Isles. 26 
Plausible statistical estimates recording the volumes of food, fuel and 
organic raw materials necessary to sustain the kingdom’s gradual upward 
momentum towards an industrial and urbanized market economy have now 
appeared in print. To simplify the narrative I propose to represent England as 
the relevant geographical and national economic unit for analysis, to ignore 
cyclical trends and cycles and to “compress” the complex history of that 
momentum to base and end year estimates for the period 1600-1800.27 
Figures carefully validated and recently published by Wrigley show: (a) that 
England’s population doubled over two centuries; (b) the numbers of people 
resident in towns of 5,000 plus inhabitants multiplied seven times to increase 
from a proportion of 6% from 24% of total population so that by 1800 41% of 
the increment to that aggregate resided in towns, with high rates of mortality 
which operated to maintain flows of migrants from villages and to dampen 
rates of increase in the land/labour ratio in the countryside; (c) meanwhile the 
share of labour force engaged in producing the food, fuel and organic raw 
materials required to sustain and employ workers detached from agriculture 
and forestry had declined from above 71% in 1600 to around 39% by 1817. 28 
These and comparable ratios published by several economic historians can 
be calibrated into a third ratio based on the measured capacity of workers 
engaged directly with the production of foodstuffs, timber and other organic 
raw materials to sustain workers and their families employed in industry and 
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services. This proxy for agrarian productivity (dominated by producers of 
foodstuffs) may have risen by more than 80% over the two centuries preceding 
1800. 29 
Early modern economic and demographic regimes as depictured by most 
economic historians are characterized by malign Malthusian tendencies. 
Typically the capacities of national supplies of cultivable land available for 
arable and pastoral farming as well as the production of organic raw materials, 
including timber for fuel, cannot sustain more than moderate rates of 
population growth. 30 Thus the key preoccupation for agrarian historians has 
long been to explain how English agriculture and forestry coped with the 
intensified demands for food, fuel and industrial raw materials placed upon 
that sector by cycles and trends in population growth that occurred after  
1600. 31 
Above all, agrarian historians have been impressed with the capacity of 
agriculture to sustain an extraordinarily rapid rate of urbanization, while 
releasing labour for work in manufacturing, mining and services. Although the 
architecture for an analytical narrative has been clear for some time, the 
cliometric ambition to specify, quantify and weight the major factors involved 
has not been satisfied. 32 
Clearly the release of labour to work in other sectors of the economy and in 
towns extended markets for foodstuffs, raw materials and fuel. While shifts in 
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the inter-sectoral terms of trade (measured long ago between industrial 
commodities and agricultural produce) reinforced incentives for investment 
and the diffusion of technologies, techniques and tenurial institutions  required 
to: extend the cultivated area, encourage regional and local specialization and 
to raise productivities of the land, labour and capital producing food, raw 
materials and fuel, while improving the conduits connecting farmers with their 
local and urban markets. 33 
Estimates (accepted as plausible by agrarian historians) suggest that wheat 
yields per acre cultivated with grain probably doubled between 1600 and  
1800. 34 Neither the publication of books concerned to display information 
about best practice farming nor applications for patents for implements 
designed to raise the productivities of labour and for techniques to augment 
yields from land allocated to improved rotations for arable and pastoral farms 
display clear upward trends until after the 1760s. Thus, it remains difficult to 
ascertain when and to what degree a “vogue” for improvement among 
landowners and tenant farmers matured into what has been represented as an 
Agricultural Enlightenment, even if generations of visitors to the mainland 
continued to be as, if not more, impressed with English agronomy than English 
industry. 35 
With new and more secure data now available to be reconceptualised, 
validated and calibrated, historians of the First Industrial Revolution may well 
become less impressed with the response to emerging prospects for 
industrialization from England’s well-endowed agriculture – favoured between 
                                                          
33
 P. O’Brien, “Agriculture and the Home Market for British Industry,” in English Historical Review, 41 (1985), 
pp. 773-800. 
34
 M. Overton, Agricultural Revolution in England and L. Brunt, “Nature or Nurture? Explaining English Wheat 
Yields in the Industrial Revolution, c. 1770,” in Journal of Economic History, 64 (2004), pp. 193-225. 
35
 P. Jones, Agricultural Enlightenment, Knowledge, Technology and Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2016). 
 
16 
 
1600 and 1800  by interludes of benign climate change and by the intensified 
concentrating in control over land, capital and labour exercised by the 
country’s land aristocracy and its brigades of deferential tenant farmers. 36 
They might, for example, observe just how much of the country’s  success in 
avoiding potentially malign Malthusian outcomes emanated from the 
intensified exploitation of England’s truly massive accessible and transportable 
reserves of coal. 37 
Without a known but under-exploited endowment of subterranean supplies 
of fuel, Malthusian pressures (exemplified by higher ratios of labour to 
cultivable land) could counterfactually have seriously reduced the albeit 
gradual momentum over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries towards an 
industrial market economy by obstructing outflows of labour to better 
remunerated employment as waged labour in other sectors of the economy 
and particularly to work in towns. Ceteris paribus, an unfavourable shift in the 
land/labour ratio could (as Malthus predicted) have exercised several 
potentially unfavourable and significant effects on the economy’s ongoing 
trajectory that included: malign mechanisms: altering the balance in the 
allocation of land away from pastoral towards arable agriculture; reducing the 
impetus to transform open fields and common pasture into larger scale tenant 
farms; raising levels of local expenditures on coercion and poor relief to 
maintain internal order in an over-populated countryside; increasing rural 
demands per capita for the kilocalories of food required for more labour 
intensive work involved in farming arable land. In short, and in the absence of 
a substitute for farm and woodland, these other forces would have reduced 
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the gains from inter-sectoral and urban-rural trade, weakened incentives to 
invest in agricultural improvements and lowered the positive externalities that 
flow from the agglomeration or specialized range of economic activities in 
towns. 38 
During the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars 1793-1815 a further but 
very marked shift occurred in the net barter inter-sectoral terms of trade 
between foodstuffs and raw materials on the one hand, and manufactured 
commodities on the other. This protracted interlude of warfare also witnessed 
a shift towards greater dependence on imports of temperate foodstuffs from 
Ireland and tropical foodstuffs (sugar, tea, coffee and organic raw materials 
and cotton fibres from the Americas and Asia). 39 These trends that became 
more marked as the industrialization and urbanization matured into its second 
stage when the process could be sustained to an increasing degree by the 
exports of cheap manufactured goods and commercial services in exchange for 
imported foodstuffs and raw materials. 40 
Meanwhile factors behind the first and preparatory stage for structural 
change can be illuminated by simple counterfactual models and tested with 
some equally simplified arithmetical calibrations based on upon demographic 
statistics that are almost certainly more secure than the manufactured data 
derived from more familiar national accounts. These numbers set out below 
are taken from the  Cambridge group’s research into the growth, occupational 
structure and location of England’s population and workforce which has served 
to foreground the degree of support that the century’s famous protracted and 
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precocious transition to an industrial market economy derived from its long 
known, massive and under-exploited reserves of coal. 41 
To reallocate labourers and their families from a traditional occupational 
and locational structure which utilized their energies for the production of 
food, raw materials and dry wood fuel, for household heat and a range of 
traditional manufacturing processes (metallurgy, glass, brewing, food 
processing) required either extensions to the areas of land producing all three 
organic outputs or increased yields from the established area of hectares 
cultivated. For economies fortunate enough to be endowed with subterranean 
forests, elastic supplies of coal could, however, substitute for land utilized to 
grow trees and alleviate the difficulties involved in raising yields on hectares 
long cultivated with crops , food, fodder and fibres. 42 
Given a set of baseline estimates for the area of land available to be 
cultivated for the food, fodder, fibres and fuel consumed by the English 
population, virtually without access to coal in 1600, it has become possible to 
construct an estimate for the area of cultivable land that would 
counterfactually have been required to maintain the 1600 pattern and levels of 
consumption of food, fibres, fodder and fuel for a population that had doubled 
and a workforce seeking employment outside agriculture and forestry had 
multiplied by a factor of 5 two centuries later. Unfortunately the statistics are 
not available for outputs or areas of land producing fodder and fibres for 1600 
or 1800. Wrigley has, however, constructed estimates for the areas of 
cultivable land that would counterfactually have been required to provide the 
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urban population for 1800 with the same per capita volumes of grain and fuel 
that sustained their ancestors at the end of the Tudor regime. 43 
I propose to assume that the per capita requirements of cultivable land 
required to meet the grain and fuel requirements for the population of rural 
England were exactly the same and to majorate Wrigley’s estimates for urban 
England to refer to the entire population. On these assumptions, the outer 
bound saving that could conceivably be imputed to the substitution of coal for 
wood, grown and dried, comes 42% of the cultivable area. That estimated ratio 
should be reduced by the small amounts of coal utilized for domestic heat and 
manufacturing in 1600, but increased by the more extensive substitutions of 
coal for thermal purposes in manufacturing and also by the reduction in 
kilocalories required for work and health from the cheaper fuel that coal 
provided to households for warmth and cooking. Thus it may be safe to 
conclude that up to 40% of the incremental food and thermal energy required 
to carry the economy of England to the levels of productivity achieved in 1800 
by its agrarian, industrial and service sectors probably emanated in some 
reductionist sense from rich and extraordinarily accessible natural 
endowments of coal. 
Yes, its European competitors for a First Industrial Revolution and even 
China also possessed subterranean forests but not apparently of the same 
variety and quality nor nearly as cheap to transport to coastal cities. Britain 
began and completed a transition from organic to mineral sources of energy, 
basically for thermal purposes before the rest of Europe and some three 
centuries before Asian economies. 44  Coal consumption per capita multiplied 
six times between 1560-1800. 45 
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By the early nineteenth century English households and firms consumed 
around 15 million tons of coal a year, compared to 3 million tons for Europe as 
a whole. Estimates for tons of coal mined in China are not available and for 
reasons that are not settled, the large scale deposits in the Northern provinces 
of the Qing Empire remained underground until well into the twentieth 
century. 46  Mainland European and East Asian economies and towns continued 
to utilize traditional substitutes such as peat, wood, water, wind and human 
energy, when the advantages for earlier urbanization and industrialization 
from using the cheaper and more efficient thermal form of energy turned out 
to be substantial.  As a substitute for wood fuel, coal allowed more land and 
other resources to be devoted to growing food, fodder and agrarian raw 
materials. Given that the energy from a ton of coal equals the energy from two 
tons of timber, and an acre of land produces two tons of dry wood, Britain’s 
coal output for 1815 implies that 15 million acres (equivalent to 88% of its 
arable area) had counterfactually by then been released from forestry to grow 
grains, vegetables, industrial raw materials and to sustain even more livestock 
and to facilitate urbanization. 47  
Heat-intensive industrial processes in metallurgy, glass making, brewing, 
refining sugar and salt, chemistry, in baking food and bricks etc., could all be 
conducted more cheaply with coal. The feedbacks and technological spin-offs 
from these industries to metallurgy and to the making of kiln’s, pots, vats and 
containers became important for industrial development. While lower cost 
bricks and metals for the construction of houses in cities, towns and industrial 
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villages, saved capital which could be invested in social overhead facilities and/ 
or manufacturing industry. 
For organic systems of production, energy accounts constitute a heuristic 
and illuminating substitute for less secure national income data for the analysis 
of transitions to modern systems of production based upon inorganic sources 
of energy. At a time when technological progress, which augmented labour 
productivity remained slow and confined to a few sectors of industry, 
countries favourably endowed with fertile land, minerals, natural waterways 
and, above all, with a cheaper fuel closely linked to the development of a  
leading, network technology (steam power) enjoyed a head start in the “leap 
forward” to a second stage of development when they matured into urban 
industrial market economies via technological change. 48 
 
Stage 1.2 The Nature and Economic Significance of Britain’s Political 
Development and the State’s Maritime Strategy for Security with 
Commerce Overseas 
Debate about the precise nature and significance of foreign trade for the 
British Industrial Revolution continues. Views on that connexion range all the 
way from “trivial and dispensable” to “necessary and sufficient”. 49 
Contemporary perceptions which maintained that commerce overseas through 
all kinds of mechanisms (not captured within a modern statistical frameworks, 
based upon national accounts), had been a significant component of British 
industrialization, have now been restored as entirely valid. For comparative 
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economic history, they may even represent the most significant of Marc 
Bloch’s salient contrasts between Britain and several of its European rivals. 50 
Over the eighteenth century, the volume of British made commodities 
sold overseas multiplied four times, compared to a multiplier of over just two, 
between 1500 and 1700, Ratios of exports to gross national product increased 
from little over 4% in the reign of Elizabeth, to 6% after the  Restoration, up to 
8% at the Glorious Revolution and that quotient reached 12% in the reign of 
George III. At least half of the increment to industrial production, which came 
on stream over a long eighteenth century (1688-1815), was sold overseas. 
Shares of the outputs exported of the then most rapidly growing and 
technically progressive of British industries (cottons, woollens, metals, 
shipbuilding) became internationally outstanding. For the development of an 
economy, led by modernizing industries, the nation’s multi-faceted 
involvement with the world economy can no longer be denied as an 
unmistakeably significant precondition for the growth with structural change 
and diversification, that took place, before during and after the Industrial 
Revolution. Already by the close of the Seven Years War, something like half of 
the nation’s workforce (de-linked from agriculture) depended directly and 
indirectly on markets overseas for its livelihood. Revenues from exports 
exchanged for strategic materials (pitch, tar, hemp, timber, bar iron;  all vital 
inputs for: the naval defence of a mercantilist realm); for imported and taxable 
tropical foodstuffs such as sugar, tea, coffee and spices, consumed by 
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“industrious” families, and, above all, for fibres for the rapidly growing cotton 
and the linen and silk industries. 51 
Over the period 1790 to 1820, net imports of farm produce (foodstuffs 
and organic raw materials) rose from abound 20% to 40% of  domestic farm 
output. Pôles de croissance (London, Bristol, Hull, Glasgow, Newcastle, 
Liverpool and other maritime cities) provided the infrastructures, skilled 
workforces and internal transportation and distribution networks to service 
internal as well as overseas trade. Their high wages attracted labour from the 
countryside. Cities and their hinterlands integrated into productive fiscal bases 
for the states rapacious demand for customs and excise duties, which were 
allocated to build up the naval power, deployed to defend British markets, 
colonial territories and assets overseas. Alas, we do not have estimates for the 
total values of commodities and services, exchanged across the world’s 
frontiers between 1660 and 1846, but Britain (not France, Portugal, and Spain, 
or the Netherlands, let alone China or Japan)  obtained an inordinate share of 
the gains from international trade and commerce over that period of proto-
globalization. 52 
Some part of the growth in commerce that generated feedbacks and 
spin-offs for Britain’s  transition to an industrial economy occurred because the 
world economy as a whole was led forward at a faster rate by the continued 
expansion of the Atlantic economy, coupled to the forging of closer 
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commercial connexions between Europe and the Americas across the Indian 
and Pacific oceans with India, South East Asia, Japan and China. Indeed the 
British economy appears to have performed exceptionally well during a long 
upswing in global trade that succeeded the consolidation of the Manchu 
dynasty (1644-83) and the break-up of the Mughal Empire in India (1761-
1818). 53 
Did that occur (as new and old Whigish historians maintain) because  
Britain’s institutions  including its quasi-democratic  system of Government, 
framework of laws surrounding commodity and factor markets and embedded 
cultures of enterprise, bourgeois virtues and enlightenment had become more 
hospitable to private investment and innovation than cultures and institutions 
conditioning the development of rival economies on the mainland, as well as 
the maritime provinces of Qing China and Tokugawa Japan? 54  Research into 
histories of continental economies and surveys of perceptions by 
contemporary European travellers to the Isles, has left historians more 
agnostic about the superiorities  of anything like the full range of institutions 
conditioning the pace and pattern of the economic activity before the 
Industrial Revolution. 55   While rediscovered economic worlds of “surprising 
resemblances” across a range of advanced regions of Eurasia, also undergoing 
Smithian growth for those same centuries, has qualified both Vulgar-Marxian 
and Neo- Weberian perceptions that only certain countries and regions of 
North Western Europe (particularly England, and Holland) had proceeded 
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along Smithian  trajectories or Schumpeterian paths for development, leading 
to modern economic growth. 56  
Both societies had certainly appropriated and defended increasing 
shares of the gains to be reaped from their mercantilistic engagements in 
global trade and commerce. 57  Nevertheless, one highly significant contrast 
between Britain and other pre-modern rivals (including Holland) for a First 
Industrial Revolution has, however, been clarified – namely, the nation’s 
geographically conditioned but politically sustained fiscal commitment to a 
naval strategy for the defence of an Island realm – which carried unintended, 
but benign consequences for the development of a public-cum-private 
maritime sector of the British economy, which together  its responsive 
agriculture and with coal led the economy forward into a First Industrial 
Revolution. 
Not long after the Hundred Years War (1337-1453) when England’s 
feudal armies had ignominiously retreated from centuries of dynastic warfare 
on the mainland, the Island’s kings, aristocrats and merchants began to 
conceive of naval power, funded and managed by the Crown, as the first line of 
defence against external threats to the security of their high stakes in the 
wealth of the realm and as the force necessary to back conquest and 
commerce with continents outside Europe. 58 
That  conception took a long time to evolve into a constitutional 
consensus because the locus of sovereignty and balance of internal power 
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among the realm’s aristocratic elites remained unstable. Political maturity  
stability emerged after nearly two centuries of fiscal stasis, malign disputes 
over religion, persistent acrimony between Parliament and the Crown’s over 
rights to levy taxes and, above all, from a reordering of the realm’s ideology 
following an interregnum of destructive civil war and republican rule. After the 
Restoration of monarchy and aristocracy in 1660, Britain’s elite managed to 
maintain a sufficient degree of consensus to establish an envied political 
coordinating mechanism, namely undemocratic Parliamentary governance by 
assemblies of wealthy inter-connected families, to safeguard and manage their 
property rights.  With vicissitudes (including a Dutch coup d’état of 1688, and 
the unavoidable loss of political power over 13 distant American colonies in 
1783), the Post-Restoration state became outstandingly successful in raising 
the funds (taxes linked to loans) required for external security, to maintain 
stability for a fundamentally ancien regime, for the protection of an 
established religion and for the maintenance of Europe’s most blatantly 
inegalitarian system of property rights.  Over time rights to own, expropriate 
and exploit  natural resources and capital located within the kingdom  became 
more effectively protected and politically coordinated by Britain’s envied 
Parliament than for any other propertied elite in Western Europe, the 
Americas, Asia and Africa. 59 
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Exceptional levels of  external security, stability and good order supplied 
by this monarchical and aristocratic regime for its wealthier citizens rested 
ultimately upon the country’s rapidly expanding fiscal and financial base. 
Between 1670 and 1815 total revenues from taxes rose by a factor of around 
17, while national income increased by a multiplier of 3. The bulk of these 
formally sanctioned appropriations by Parliaments of “notables” were 
allocated by central government to service a national debt, incurred to fund no 
less than eleven wars against other European powers and economic rivals – 
mainly conflicts with France and Spain, but including four naval wars against its 
protestant neighbour - the Netherlands. 60 
From a nominal capital of less than £2 million in the reign of James II, 
Britain’s national debt grew to reach the astronomical sum  of £854 million, or 
2.7 times the national income for 1819. The shares of taxes devoted to 
servicing, what appeared to a majority of taxpayers as an incubus of royal-cum-
public debt, jumped from modal ratios of 2-3% before the Glorious Revolution 
to 60% after the Napoleonic War. 61  
Castlereagh and other European statesmen who signed the Treaty of 
Vienna, were acutely aware of the costs of geopolitical strife. Yet the, by then, 
United Kingdom of England, Wales, Scotland and Ireland, enjoyed virtually 
complete security from external aggression and had acquired in the course of a 
century and a half of prolonged mercantilist rivalry and warfare, extraordinary 
shares of world trade and income from servicing global commerce and the 
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largest European empire since Rome. By 1815 the realm’s domestic economy 
also stood half-way through a First Industrial Revolution. 62 
To thrive in a mercantilist economic order, riven with dynastic, imperial 
and economic rivalries, the Island state had allocated considerable resources 
to: preclude invasion, preserve internal stability and retain advantages over its 
equally violent European competitors in armed struggles for gains from global 
commerce and colonization. Even cliometricians now recognize that 
geopolitical conditions formed inescapable parameters within which state 
formation, institution, building and macro-economic growth occurred. 63 For 
the age of mercantilism post hoc analyses by economists of yesteryear based 
upon counterfactual scenarios concerned with competitive equilibria 
“distorted” by taxation, and more recently with theoretically ambiguous and 
unmeasurable “crowding out” effects that flowed from high levels of 
government borrowing look like interesting, but anachronistic exercises in 
applied econometrics. 64 They are surely irrelevant as responses to questions of 
whether the state had raised and allocated the resources that carried the 
kingdom and its economy to a plateau of  safety, political stability and 
potential for future development attained and envied by the rest of Europe, at 
the Congress of  Vienna. Since nobody then (or historians later) have 
elaborated upon alternative strategies which combined security for the realm 
and internal order with growth for the economy, the comparison of an entirely 
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explicable maritime strategy for security and development, pursued by the 
British state with strategies pursued by rival European and Asian powers, leads 
to the Panglossian conclusion that virtually everything that was done looks 
unavoidable, was undertaken for the best in the worst of all possible worlds 
and paid off. 65 
Inaugurated under the republic, the costs incurred to support 
geopolitical security with economic power can be read from tabulations of the 
state’s relative and persistently high levels of expenditure on the Royal Navy. 66 
That sustained commitment provided the kingdom with the world’s largest 
fleet of battleships, cruisers and frigates, manned by a virtually coerced 
workforce of underpaid able seamen, under the command of a highly 
motivated and well rewarded corps of professional officers. 67 The fleet was 
constructed and maintained in readiness for multiple missions at sea by an 
onshore workforce of skilled shipwrights, carpenters and other artisans and 
supported by an infra-structure of ports, harbours, dockyards, stores for 
victuals and spare parts, ordnance depots and other facilities under 
collaborative but well-coordinated public and private ownership and control. 68 
Once the Island’s huge fleet and extensive onshore infra-structure of 
human and physical capital were operating, primarily to keep ships of line 
strategically placed at sea as the first bastion of defence for the realm, at 
falling average costs the state deployed cruisers, frigates and other well- 
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armed ships on mercantilist missions for the protection of British trade and its 
colonies; for predation on competitive and potentially hostile merchant 
marines; for the bombardment (actual or threatened) of enemy coastal cities 
and colonies. 69 Britain’s evolving maritime strategy that in effect combined 
defence with trade and growth embodied all kinds of attendant and 
unintended spin-offs for internal order, for the protection of property rights 
and for the extension of domestic as well as colonial and foreign markets. 
For example, the nation’s fleet of durable, strategically placed and 
proficient ships of the line (floating fortresses) provided external security at a 
relative high level of efficiency compared to the logistical costs per joule of 
force delivered by larger European armies, recruited, mobilized, equipped, 
supplied with food and forage, and moved overland to battle grounds, places 
of siege and vulnerable borders to repel enemy attacks. 70 
Its economically efficient offshore strategy for defence also allowed the 
British state to allocate greater proportions of its revenues (derived from a 
responsive fiscal and financial system) to support mercantilist and imperial 
missions pursued at sea, and at the same time to sustain surprisingly high 
levels of military expenditure. 71 Paradoxically and throughout the period 1688-
1815, expenditures on armies by the Eurasian state most committed to naval 
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power, amounted to a modal 60% of the total allocated to the realm’s armed 
forces. 72   
Part of that military allocation included the costs of hiring mercenary 
regiments of Hanoverian, Swiss, Hessian and other soldiers for combat outside 
the kingdom; part consisted of subsidies and subventions to European allies 
willing to field troops to contain and thwart the designs of France and its allies 
on the mainland, and in India and the Americas. The most politically 
contentious part consisted of the commitment of English supplemented by 
dispensable Celtic troops to theatres of war on the continent, notably in 1702-
12 and 1808-15. Strategic expenditures on the military forces of Britain’s 
clients and allies restrained the ambitions of Bourbon states (France and Spain) 
and other antagonists from allocating funds to construct fleets with the 
capability required to mount serious challenges to the Royal Navy’s defence of 
the realm and its effective protection of the nation’s interest in overseas trade 
and investment. 73 
Thus, a considerable proportion of revenues, surplus to requirements for 
the Royal Navy was allocated to British regiments, militias, volunteers and 
yeomanry on stations in the realm. They served  as a less than credible second 
line of defence against foreign invasions, but were utilized consistently during 
a potentially unstable period of population growth, industrialization and 
urbanization, to preserve an aristocratic regime against subversion on  its 
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Celtic fringes and to protect English hierarchy and property rights against 
challenges to law and order. 74 
From time to time prospects for internal trade within a less than United 
Kingdom came under threat from within those potentially seditious provinces 
of Scotland and Ireland; particularly the latter where a colonized Catholic 
population resented “English” property rights and the metropole’s 
discriminatory regulation of Irish commerce and industry. 75 With external 
security taken for granted, other public goods such as stability, good order, the 
maintenance of property rights and support for hierarchy and authority over 
potentially unruly employees became the key political-cum-economic interest 
for landowners, merchants, farmers, industrialists and other businessmen of 
Hanoverian Britain. On the whole the kingdom’s monarchical and aristocratic 
state met their concerns. When lobbied, it redefined legal rights for new forms 
of wealth by promulgating statutes for a national economy which superseded 
custom and common laws that might otherwise have been used to provide 
greater protection for the welfare of the nation’s workforce without assets, 
status and power, but threatened by market forces associated with 
industrialization and the modernization of agriculture. 76 
For example, the institutions of the Elizabethan poor law for dealing with 
poverty, unemployment, vagrancy and labour migration maintained a 
repressive system of control over the labour of children, females and unskilled 
men. For less vulnerable artisans and industrial workers and especially for 
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those courageous groups who formed “combinations” to challenge what they 
perceived to be adverse changes to a traditional and more moral economy, the 
punishments prescribed by Parliament for: the formation of unions;  for riots 
against high prices of basic necessities; for resistance to enclosures and 
turnpikes; to attacks upon mills, barns, factories and labour saving machinery; 
for insubordinate and disorderly conduct as well as every kind of theft, became 
discernibly harsher, and increasingly subject to capital punishment. 77 
Parliament’s antipathies to large standing armies in times of peace looks 
like Whig rhetoric because the actual numbers of troops, embodied militiamen 
and patriotic volunteers on station in Britain and Ireland year after year 
(particularly in wartime), were more than  adequate to repress disturbances to 
the peace. For purposes of political stability, the maintenance of internal 
order, the protection of property and upholding hierarchies of all kinds, it is 
not at all obvious that on a per capita basis, that constitutional Britain 
commanded a smaller or less coercive force of troops than so-called 
“despotisms” on the mainland of Europe, who deployed armies (not capital 
intensive navies) to defend their more vulnerable frontiers. Famously, in 1808 
the numbers of soldiers mobilized to combat Luddites in the Midlands and 
North of England, exceeded troops under Wellington’s command in the 
Peninsular. 
With virtually no police at their command, the Navy allowed the political 
authorities (central, county and  local) of Hanoverian Britain to allocate less of 
their revenues to external security and to provide an effective military 
presence and exemplary displays of the armed force required to maintain good 
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order, protect property and preserve authority among a population, becoming 
more urban and potentially “dangerous” by the year. England’s ungovernable 
people were eventually subjugated and cajoled into the culture of deference 
with xenophobia that characterized Victorian society. 78  
Stage 1.3: The Discovery, Take-up and Diffusion of “English” Technologies 
For several reasons, the invention and diffusion of a familiar list of 
machines, energy  converters and industrial processes, long represented as 
“English” and defined as prime movers behind the national economy’s 
precocious transition,  have been relocated from its historiographical position 
of prominence to contexts where their significance for global history has been 
reconfigured. That has occurred not only as the outcome of cliometric 
exercises displaying trends in total factor productivity that imply  that the First 
Industrial Revolution can no longer be represented as a short sharp 
discontinuity based upon fundamental breakthroughs in industrial 
technologies, which were conceived as emanating from and developing within 
a singularly progressive set of Anglo-Saxon institutions and cultures. 79 
Although several new technologies emerged and matured in Britain not 
long after the Seven Years War, their impact was confined to particular sectors 
of industry (cotton textiles, metallurgy, shipbuilding, transportation and the 
generation of energy from steam). Furthermore, technologies and 
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organizations that became first  wonders and eventually the marks of a 
modern economy (machines, steam power, processes for making and shaping 
metals, chemicals, factories, etc.) but matured rather slowly over a century of 
so-called  “revolutionary transition” after 1756. 80   Thus calibrations purporting 
to account in quantitative terms for the sources of British economic growth 
which are derived from exercises that “fit” production functions to extant, but 
imperfect data for national output and for  inputs of land, labour and capital 
expose the persistence of an entirely traditional, gradual and extensive form of 
aggregated growth for GDP per capita, which emanated mainly from 
somewhat higher rates of capital accumulation and upswings in the scale and 
hours worked by a workforce undergoing structural change rather than 
innovations or even new sources of energy per se. 81 
Although these taxonomic exercises  provide historical perspective, and 
serve to quantify the significance of “proximate” sources behind the growth of 
Britain’s domestic product. 82 They also tend to ignore the historical evolution 
of conditions for the emergence and diffusion of technologies that created 
prospects for long-run and sustained upswings in rates of growth. Discoveries 
and their diffusion occurred in many regions of a connected, but not integrated 
Eurasian Oikumene. 83  In the British case and after protracted debate over 
relevant models and acceptable  statistics, economic historians are now taking  
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into account  both the quality of the data at their disposal to locate and 
demarcate chronologies, as well as reciprocal interactions between profitable 
opportunities provided by the appearance of new process and product 
innovations on the one hand, and capital formation for their development and 
exploitation on the other. Furthermore, they have concentrated analyses upon 
the sources of the incremental addition to a traditional and low rate of growth 
in real per capita incomes. These statistical exercises do suggest that the 
potential for technical progress which was present by the times of Newton, 
Newcomen and Kay had evolved to reach a vantage point around the time of 
the Victorian boom when its outcome for the growth of the economy could be 
retrospectively perceived and has latterly been measured as highly  
significant. 84 Thus, and without the early discovery, gradual development and 
slow take-up of technologies and improved modes of organization that 
augmented capital labour ratios and average levels of productivity for a 
majority of the workforce, the British economy could never have been 
acclaimed as the locus of a First Industrial Revolution. 85 
The technologies that only gradually became operational and then 
dominant for the growth of British industry can be most heuristically 
represented by a chapter included in a longer and more complex historical 
narrative. That chapter would recognize their confined scope for 
transformation not only for all sectors of the national economy, but for 
England’s leading sector of manufacturing itself. Older economic histories 
dealing with industries (other than those paradigm cases of revolutionary 
change, cotton textiles and iron) were aware of the decades taken and costs 
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incurred to develop and adapt blueprints for invention through several stages 
of development and  protracted periods of learning by using, until original and 
promising designs matured into marketable, prototype machines, processes 
and artefacts. 86 Historians with knowledge of particular industries appreciated 
that the forward planning and investment required to embody a backlog of 
known product and process innovations by British firms, long connected to 
markets for commodities, labour and capital, took decades to mature. Such 
firms had to be networked to suppliers of raw materials and to transportation 
and distribution services so that entrepreneurs exploiting new knowledge 
could realize external economies of scale and agglomeration by locating in 
Britain’s industrial towns and maritime cities. The costs of system-wide 
investments required to develop,  embody and relocate people and production 
in factories and towns turned out to be large multipliers of the original outlays 
borne by inventors and their networks supporting research and development 
into ”potentially” useful and commercially viable knowledge in the first  
place. 87 
As pioneer movers into unexplored realms and spaces for the exploitation 
of novel industrial products and technologies, British investors and 
entrepreneurs lacked examples of anything like a prior range experiments and 
experience from elsewhere, as well as access to a  base of systemic and 
reliable knowledge of how, where and why things work that later in the  
nineteenth century  exposed the problems, ramifications and potential for 
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untried methods of production and novel products more rapidly and at lower 
cost. 88  
Although British businessmen and investors lacked references to practice 
elsewhere and to a focussed and utilitarian body of science to inspire even 
greater confidence to undertake risky investments in new technologies, their 
direct support for research and  development and for a more rapid and 
extensive diffusion of potentially useful knowledge already available, by the 
middle of the 18th century  does not appear, with hindsight, to have been that 
“entrepreneurial”. Considered as a national group, British capitalists promoted 
and managed one of the slowest, and for the working classes, more miserable 
transitions to an industrial economy in world history. 89 
Subsequent faster and often less socially malign industrial revolutions are 
marked by higher rates of saving and investment and a more rapid take up of 
advanced technology than they seem to have been willing to contemplate for a 
First Industrial Revolution. In the British case the ratio of gross investment to 
national income took more than a century to double from a rather low base 
point of around 6% in 1760. 90 In relation to countries that followed Britain, this 
again looks in retrospect, like unimpressive average and marginal propensities 
to save and invest in the social overhead and industrial capital required to 
promote faster urbanization. 91 
The slow rise in domestic capital formation required to exploit new 
technologies cannot, moreover, be attributed to the massive sums of 
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otherwise surplus investible funds borrowed by the state for wars against 
France, Spain, the Netherlands and other  European rivals and the United 
States. Counterfactually Government borrowing for purposes of waging war (in 
all eleven conflicts from 1652-1802) might, in theory, have “crowded out” 
some potential for higher rates of private capital formation, but the overall 
effect could equally well have been positive for structural change. The 
observed variations between years of war and interludes of peace in real rates 
of interest received by investors on low risk government securities floated and 
sold on the London capital market, does not suggest that Britain was an 
economy constrained by capacities to save. On the contrary, the overall supply 
of investible funds that appeared during all three major wars, 1756-1793, 
appears rather elastic with respect to additional demands from a state that 
offered both domestic and international capital markets attractive and secure 
paper assets. Government borrowing to wage war also promoted the 
development of financial intermediation in London and moves towards 
integration of a national capital market across the kingdom (linked to 
European money markets) which raised both the elasticity of the money supply 
and improved the allocation of investible funds. 92 
To return to the analysis of strategic expenditures elaborated above, 
models of crowding out that neglect the benefits (and incentives for 
investment) provided by high rates of expenditure by the state upon external 
security, the protection of commerce and colonization overseas and a 
repressive but effective system for internal order, are seriously under-
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specified. Balance sheets (costs and benefits) flowing from expenditures upon 
these indispensable public goods would certainly be difficult to model and 
impossible to add up. Given that rather high levels of expenditure on the army 
and navy were necessary for state formation and the preservation of British 
institutions (particularly when periodic threats of invasion by sea appeared in 
wartime) the crowding out hypothesis needs to be reformulated as the 
problem of estimating the proportions of taxes and loans devoted to security 
and stability that could conceivably be defined as “unnecessary and wasteful” 
appropriations and allocations by a geopolitically located Hanoverian state. 
Few mercantilists of the period suggested that the depressing effects on 
private savings and investment flowing from the operations of the fiscal and 
financial system exceeded the benign effects of “crowding in” which they 
argued, depended upon the effective provision of external security, successful 
mercantilism, stability and internal order. 93  Adam Smith certainly appreciated 
that defence came before opulence and that unilateral withdrawal from the 
prevailing geopolitical order surrounding an Island state was never an option 
or, historians might well add, a counterfactual worth pursuing. 94 
Once expenditures by the state are reconfigured as necessary (or at the 
least unavoidable) for macro-economic growth then, in retrospect, rates of 
development and take-up of advanced technologies and urban systems of 
production by businessmen and investors during as ostensibly revolutionary 
period for the discovery and diffusion of new technology, cease to appear 
anything like as entrepreneurial and historically remarkable as Anglo-American 
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historiography has, for too long, maintained. 95 At the time, most classical 
economists recognized there was nothing particularly “progressive” about the 
country’s aristocratic and wealthy elites. Majorities among the owners and 
controllers of property rights to the nation’s cultivable land, sub-soil minerals, 
urban sites and real estate, transportation systems, commercial and 
distribution networks, banks and other forms of financial intermediation, 
industrial buildings, plant and machinery, human and professional capital 
reinvested rather low proportions of the rents that accrued to them from 
industrialization and urbanization. 
Predictably , generations of a patriotic history profession researching into 
the Island’s agriculture, commerce and industry and in touch with the records 
of firms and the biographies of exceptional men of wealth, have published 
what has now turned into a library of case studies that displays nothing less 
than an entirely favourable impression of British landowners, farmers, 
merchants, industrialists, bankers, professional experts and others with 
surpluses to save and invest in the new technologies and urban systems of 
production that came on stream after Britain’s decisive victory for external 
security with imperial hegemony in the Seven Years War. But did British 
capitalists or culture manifest a national geist or kopf for risk-taking and 
improvement that was very different from anything displayed by their 
ostensibly more cautious counterparts on the mainland. 96 
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Of course, numerous and well documented examples of commendable 
foresight, perseverance, risk-taking, innovation and entrepreneurship, 
particularly for the leading industries, can be drawn from the rich 
historiography of the First Industrial Revolution. 97  Nevertheless, research by 
the current generation of economic historians has reconfigured business 
history within a statistical base in order to engage with potentialities for 
illumination derived from macro-economic modelling. This programme in 
economic history (as Robert Allen’s recent synthesis shows), has seriously 
qualified (if not degraded) the notion that an insular “culture” ordering 
economic behaviour on the British Isles could be represented as exceptionally 
enterprising. 98 Looking retrospectively at The Industrial Revolution configured 
as a macro-economic event for a favourably endowed and profitably 
embedded economy expanding into a wider world economy, several 
statistically validated arguments now suggest that (within an environment of 
historically integrated domestic markets and unsurpassed protection by the 
Hanoverian state for commerce overseas, the take-up of new technology, 
investment in the construction of urban agglomerations and formation of the 
social overhead capital required to realize the potential of technologies that 
appeared after the Seven Years War, seems anything like as enlightened 
bourgeois or virtuous as other recent texts suggest. 99 
This view is a post hoc but defensible representation because nothing in the 
macro-economic data currently available suggests that: (a) rates of return 
accruing to owners of property declined during the Industrial Revolution, (b) 
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that gains from investment in the capital formation required for faster and 
more extensive industrialization, combined with urbanization were being 
steadily eroded by rises in real product wages that exceeded or even 
converged upon the observed increase in labour productivity, or (c) that 
warfare was anything other than an integral part (rather than a costly 
diversion) from the whole historical process. On the contrary, macro-economic 
trends (as currently measured for a British Industrial Revolution) all look 
promotional for higher rates of saving, investment and innovation. After falling 
below the 10% mark during the recession in economic activity that surrounded 
crisis and war with England’s Thirteen Colonies in North America) average 
rates of return on all forms of capital other than agricultural land, fluctuated 
cyclically, but had doubled before the mid-nineteenth century. By then even 
real rents from farmed land (the sector in relative decline) had risen by nearly 
50%. As for real wages, over the century that succeeded the Seven Years War, 
they passed through three cycles or phases: slow improvement (c. 1761-1800), 
virtual stasis (1800-20) and upswing (1820-51) and reached a point around 
mid-century which stood some 45% above their initial level. 100 
Meanwhile, labour productivity had followed a different trajectory and 
displays a faster rate of increase to arrive at a level 87% above its base line 
average. Classical features of all industrial revolutions, namely, higher rates of 
growth in labour productivity, emanating from general purpose technologies, 
combined with increasing returns derived from the agglomeration of 
production in towns probably became more evident during The First Industrial 
Revolution than they had already been during Italian and Dutch Golden Ages or 
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earlier efflorescences. 101 Yet the British case was marked by a uniquely gradual 
rate of change, a slow take up of new technology and a “deplorably” low rate 
of investment in the housing and infrastructure of towns required to support a 
more rapid and less immiserising transition to industrial society. 102 
This feature of the First Industrial Revolution rather than machinery and 
factories aroused condemnations from visitors from the mainland as well as 
previous generations of British reformers and social historians concerned with 
the health of towns and the conditions of those whose labour made the 
transition both possible and necessary. 103 Social amelioration and jack up in 
investment rates took a long time to emerge, partly because the fiscally 
emasculated state that emerged from the Napoleonic wars did not raise the 
taxes required to do much to help other than continue to protect the realm’s 
commerce and an over- expanded empire overseas; partly because average 
real wages (and aggregate demand) increased too slowly, but partly because 
British economic elites, with enviable capacities to save, reinvested such small 
proportions of the rising share of the “rentier type” income that they obtained 
from their stakes in inherited ownership of property rights during a period of 
transition to an urban industrial economy. 104  Commendable examples of 
enterprise behind the riskier and innovatory investments in industry and 
commerce that appeared during the period testify to the entrepreneurship of 
some Britons, but  their laudable achievements must be conceived within the 
contextualized macro-economic frameworks, recently constructed by Allen, 
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Clark, Crafts, Harley, Mokyr, Voth  and other cliometricians whose publications 
have, in effect, reconfigured the Industrial Revolution as a precocious, but 
unremarkable and rather predictable transition in the long global history of 
knowledge formation. 105  Very few economists or economic historians now 
regard England’s famous “revolution” as a paradigm for comparable changes 
that could be emulated elsewhere, or believe that labour productivities 
currently displayed by the world’s industrial market economies would look 
different, but for the economic transformation that occurred in Britain 
between 1763 and 1846. 106 
Furthermore, and in so far as the discovery and development of new 
technologies for industry, transportation and agriculture that appeared during 
this period can be connected to an evolving base of scientific knowledge and 
its promise of prospects for the manipulation of nature the accumulation of 
that kind of knowledge has been realistically depicted as Eurasian in its remote 
and European in its proximate origins. 107  Britain’s advantages resided more in 
the development and improvement and diffusion of technology than in 
discovery itself.108 Some historians continue, however, to argue that even in a 
European and much more plausibly, in an Asian context, British “culture” 
became more receptive to an intermingling of science with business, with 
religion and with politics than was the case elsewhere across Eurasia109. 
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Studies of several contexts for the discovery and diffusion of useful and reliable 
knowledge in France, Italy and even Spain, has, however, made it more difficult 
to accept Anglocentric assertions that the monarchies, aristocracies, 
ecclesiastical and political elites, and especially the military on the European 
mainland were somehow less “rational” and open to the potentialities of new 
knowledge than their counterparts off-shore.110 That debate now seems to be 
something of a hangover from religious controversies over the reformation, 
that gave rise to memorable, but unproven, theories about the positive 
connexions between Protestantism and entrepreneurship. Protestantism and 
hard work, as well as Protestantism and science, lifted uncritically from Max 
Weber’s and Robert Merton’s seminal hypotheses.111 It will, moreover, surely 
be difficult to prove that the urban and commercial cultures of  Europe’s (even 
Asia’s) maritime cities could be depicted as discernibly less rational, calculating 
and utilitarian than the cultures of elites residing in British towns or embodied 
in British educational institutions, or evident in British publishing and 
information flows.112  Porter and  Mokyr have made claims for the 
exceptionalism of a British enlightenment, that contrasts with another 
controversial interpretation of the “long 18th century” in British history as a 
period marked by the persistence of an ancien regime presided over by an 
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autocratic, aristocratic and confessional state. Cultural turns by nations, cities 
or elites towards progress are difficult to expose, let alone measure.113  
Early in the eighteenth century, European visitors did, however, recognize 
that British industry was moving ahead in certain spheres of industrial 
technology. Indeed, several governments engaged in espionage in order to 
close gaps as they opened up, particularly for technologies with military 
potential.114 The appearance of British machines on the mainland even in Spain 
occurred rather rapidly before the outbreak of the French Revolution and the 
long interlude of destructive warfare that arrested diffusion to and across the 
mainland, from 1791 to 1815. Within Europe technological advances tended to 
appear, moreover, in branches of industrial production which had reached a 
certain scale and diversity in production. While in some well-known British 
cases (cotton and bar iron are prime  examples) that occurred after processes 
of import substitution. Foreign products pioneered access and extended access 
to the realm and tempted British businessmen to press for protection and to 
engage in a search for indigenous ways of satisfying first domestic, then 
imperial, and eventually, foreign demand. The process involved the creation, 
by a sympathetic mercantilist state, of helpful matrices of legislation and fiscal 
incentives surrounding commodity and labour markets for Britain and 
protection for markets and imperial possessions overseas.115 We now know a 
great deal more about the institution of apprenticeship and prosopographical 
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surveys of artisans and craftsmen have revealed weak linkages to the patent 
system, but clear connexions to science and scientists.116 
It is, moreover, widely recognized that technological innovation depended, 
to some considerable degree, on the prior accumulation of a skilled and mobile 
industrial workforce of artisans and craftsmen. To explain how, when and why 
the British economy managed to build up the range of aptitudes and skills 
required to promote and carry breakthroughs in scientific understanding and 
technological knowledge through a necessary stage of development to points 
of commercial viability has not been easy. Economic theory is not particularly 
helpful in explaining the formation of human capital, but economic history is 
generating promising findings from the records of England’s urban gilds, and 
tracing their connexions to the rise, embodiment and maintenance of skills 
among European workforces.117 Alas, this not yet at a stage where contrasts 
across the continents, countries, regions and towns of mainland Europe can be 
discerned, measured and explained. 
Contexts for human capital formation were, however,  invariably  urban. On 
the Isles, London, Bristol, Nottingham, Birmingham, Manchester,Glasgow and 
even Dublin all became important locations for the development of skilled 
workforces.118 Immigrant German, Flemish, Dutch and Hugenot craftsmen, 
merchants and financiers, clearly played an important role in starting and 
moving the process forward in Britain. Skilled men were attracted from the 
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mainland to a kingdom that promised security from external aggression, 
religious toleration and from time to time, royal protection and subsidies. 
Those with interests in trade with the Americas, Africa and Asia, they could be 
assured of protection from the Royal Navy. Europeans settled and, as part of 
extended families and diasporas, maintained links with kin and communities 
embodying useful knowledge from all over Europe. In an age when the 
diffusion and adaptation of technology occurred basically through the 
migration of skilled and professional manpower, the obvious attractions of a 
domicile in English towns was reinforced by warfare and religious persecution 
on the mainland.119 
 
2. Conclusions: Deconstructing and Reconstructing the First Industrial 
Revolution 
After the Seven Years War when England’s agriculture, coal mines and the 
state continued to support urbanization, structural change and occupational 
diversification, the economy reached a plateau of possibilities for an 
accelerated rate of economic growth, based increasingly on technological 
innovation. 
This second stage of the Industrial Revolution carried the Island to the clear 
position of competitive advantage if retained between 1846-73 over the 
economies of mainland Europe, as well as an indisputable status of material 
superiority over the agrarian economies of south and east Asia.120  
That brief Victorian interlude had taken centuries to mature and was based 
to some significant degree  upon natural endowments, locational advantages 
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and naval power.  Investment in and patronage for technological innovation 
continued to depend upon the wealth and political support of elites, whose 
education, culture and confidence had become permeated by scientific views 
of prospects for the manipulation of nature and economic progress.121 
Nevertheless it has become clear that only the long term accumulation of 
knowledge and skills embodied in England’s urbanized workforce could have 
taken the range of European-wide breakthroughs in scientific knowledge, 
blueprints for production and prototype machinery to levels of commercial 
viability.122 
Over time and as historical outcomes flowing from the release of labour, 
food and fuel, as well as the agglomeration of a relatively young workforce in 
urban contests actively promoted the accumulation of the human capital 
required for all three processes (discovery, development and diffusion) 
involved in technological innovation. For several decades the comparative 
advantages that the national economy derived from the skills embodied in its 
urban workforce emanated  from men employed in a narrow range of 
industries (pre-eminently textiles, metallurgy, mining, shipbuilding and civil 
engineering). Although the mercantilist state did its best to prevent the 
emigration of skilled labour to rival economies, the attempt failed.123  
Furthermore, that early advantage was destined to pass away through the 
familiar workings of labour migration and investment in formal and informal 
systems of technical education.124  
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 In order to help scholars, publics, politicians and the mass media to 
comprehend The First Industrial Revolution and the rather rapid convergence 
of Western Europe into an inter-related and ultimately integrated set of 
successful industrial market economies, it is now appropriate to place the 
British transition within much longer time spans and wider geographical 
frames that include Africa, the Americas and East  Asia, as well as the 
mainland. In Hodgson’s long stream of time and recently revealed pre-modern 
“world of surprising economic resemblances”, the Industrial Revolution can be 
re-contextualized as a precocious but not that remarkable a period in the 
global history for a tiny proportion of mankind’s escape from diminishing 
returns endemic to all traditional economies. Real growth (florescence’s) in 
labour productivity and incomes per capita had occurred in other places and 
other times for centuries prior to the Seven Years War.125  Before long natural 
disasters, geopolitical shocks and Malthusian checks returned complex but 
organically based economies to stasis or imperceptible rates of growth. 
Geography ensured that the Isles were predestined to avoid the first affliction. 
In the wake of an interregnum of civil war and with a boost from an interlude 
of republican rule, a properly funded Royal Navy emerged to protect the 
economy from the second. Then a gradual diffusion of novel technologies and 
inorganic sources of energy turned out to be sufficient to confound Malthus 
and to produce a First Industrial Revolution.126 Britain escaped first. Western 
Europe and its European offshoots overseas soon followed.127 High and rising 
standards of living can now be observed in many regions of a rapidly 
integrating world economy. For a twenty-first century frame of historical 
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reference, being first matters a lot less than the inequalities associated with 
capitalism, the North-South divide and the persistence of mass poverty.128 For 
solutions to those problems there is no British model, no distinctively British 
enlightenment and no need for patriotic histories of a British Industrial 
Revolution, proclaiming Britain, Holland or any other nationalistically 
constructed location or culture to be its locus or origin, let alone as a paradigm 
for modern economic growth. Our colleagues in art history have shown us that 
the Florentines are no longer the proud possessors of the Renaissance. 
Modern Chinese and Japanese scholars now pertinently observe neither 
English (nor European) history can be represented global destiny.129 Marshal 
Hodgson observed four decades ago that “without the cumulative history of 
the whole Afro-Eurasian Oikoumene of which the occident has been an 
integral part, the Western transmutation would be almost unthinkable.130 The 
British Industrial Revolution is not separable from the global, historical, 
geographical and geopolitical contexts in which it took place. 131 
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